Recent years witness a growing interest in nonstandard epistemic logics of "knowing whether", "knowing what", "knowing how", and so on. These logics are usually not normal, i.e., the standard axioms and reasoning rules for modal logic may be invalid. In this paper, we show that the conditional "knowing value" logic proposed by Wang and Fan [12] can be viewed as a disguised normal modal logic by treating the negation of the Kv operator as a special diamond. Under this perspective, it turns out that the original first-order Kripke semantics can be greatly simplified by introducing a ternary relation R c i in standard Kripke models, which associates one world with two i-accessible worlds that do not agree on the value of constant c. Under intuitive constraints, the modal logic based on such Kripke models is exactly the one studied by Wang and Fan [12, 13] . Moreover, there is a very natural binary generalization of the "knowing value" diamond, which, surprisingly, does not increase the expressive power of the logic. The resulting logic with the binary diamond has a transparent normal modal system, which sharpens our understanding of the "knowing value" logic and simplifies some previously hard problems.
Introduction
Classic epistemic logic à la von Wright and Hintikka mainly studies the inference patterns about propositional knowledge by using a modal operator K i to express that agent i knows that a proposition is true. Epistemic logic has been successfully applied to various fields to capture knowledge and its change in multi-agent settings, such as distributed systems and imperfect information games (cf. e.g. [3, 9] ). However, in everyday life, knowledge is often expressed in terms of knowing the answer to an embedding question, such as "I know whether the claim is true", "I know what your password is", "I know how to prove the theorem" and so on. Recent years witness a growing interest in the logics of such knowledge expressions [7, 8, 12, 13, 4, 5, 10] . The fundamental idea is to simply treat "knowing ⋆ Yanjing Wang acknowledges the support from the National Program for Special Support of Eminent Professionals and NSSF key projects 12&ZD119. The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
whether", "knowing what", "knowing how" as new modalities, just as "knowing that" in standard epistemic logic (cf. the survey [11] ).
The resulting logics are usually not normal in the technical sense that usual modal axioms and rules may be invalid. For example, the K axiom for normal modal logic is not valid for the knowing whether operator, i.e., Kw(p → q) ∧ Kwp → Kwq does not hold, e.g., knowing that p is false makes sure that you know whether p and also whether p → q, but it does not tell you anything about the truth value of q. Similarly, knowing how to swim and knowing how to cook does not mean knowing how to swim and cook at the same time, thus invalidating Khp ∧ Khq → Kh(p ∧ q), a theorem in normal modal logic when taking Kh as a box modality.
On the other hand, the non-normality does not necessarily mean that we have to abandon Kripke models for more general models. As demonstrated in [5] , we can still use Kripke models to accommodate those non-normal modal logics by using nonstandard yet intuitive truth conditions for the new modalities. However, there is usually a clear asymmetry between the relatively simple modal language and the "rich" model which may cause troubles in axiomatizing the logic. For example, the conditional knowing value logic proposed in [12] has the following language ELKv r (where i ∈ I, p ∈ P, c ∈ C and I, P, C are countably infinite):
where Kv i (φ, c) says that i knows [what] the value of c [is], given φ, e.g., I know the password of this website given it is 4-digit, since I may have only one 4-digit password ever, although I am not sure which password I used for this website without the information on the digits. The language is interpreted on first-order Kripke models = 〈S, D, {→ i : i ∈ I}, V, V C 〉 where 〈S, {→ i : i ∈ I}, V 〉 is a standard Kripke model, and D is a constant domain, and V C assigns to each (non-rigid) c ∈ C an element in D on each s ∈ S. The semantics for the new Kv i operator is as follows:
According to this semantics, the formula Kv i (φ, c) can also be understood as a firstorder modal formula:
1 Thus ELKv r can be viewed as a (small) fragment of first-order modal logic where a quantifier is packed with a modality. It is shown in [12] that ELKv r is equally expressive as public announcement logic extended with unconditional Kv i operators proposed in [7] (i.e., only Kv i (⊤, c) are allowed). Satisfiability of ELKv r over arbitrary models is PSPACE-complete, as proved in [2] . Note that although values are assigned to the constants in the model, we cannot talk about them explicitly in the language. In fact, we only care about whether on some worlds a given constant has exactly the same value. The contrast between the rich model and the simple language made the completeness proof of the following axiomatization r 5 quite involved over multi-agent S5 models (cf. [13] In this paper, we look at ELKv r from a new yet "normal modal logic" perspective in order to answer the following questions:
(i) Since we do not talk about values in the language, is there a simpler valuefree Kripke-model based semantics for ELKv r that can keep the logic (valid formulas) the same? If so, we can restore the symmetry between the language and the model and understand the essence of our logic.
(ii) Can ELKv r be linked to a normal modal logic (modulo some syntactic transformation)? If so, we can apply many standard modal logic techniques to simplify previously complicated discussions.
We give positive answers to both questions, inspired by a crucial observation: Note that to simplify the technical discussion in order to reveal the crucial points, in this paper we focus on the logic over arbitrary models. Our techniques can be applied to the S5 setting.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as below:
• We give a simple alternative Kripke semantics to ELKv r without value assignments, which does not change the set of valid formulas. The completeness proof is much simpler compared to the one in [13] .
• We generalize ◊ c i φ in a natural way to a binary diamond operator ◊ c i (φ, ψ). It turns out the generalization does not increase the expressive power of the logic but it can give us a transparent normal modal logic proof system.
• The normal modal logic perspective helps us to discover a bisimulation notion for ELKv r and obtain a proof system for a weaker language proposed by [7] .
Our findings show that ELKv r is essentially a "disguised" normal logic, and this may help us to understand such nonstandard epistemic operators better.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first introduce in Section 2 the language with the unary diamond ◊ c i and a semantics based on Kripke model with both binary and ternary relations under three intuitive constraints. We show that this semantics is equivalent to the original FO Kripke semantics of ELKv r modulo validity (under a straightforward syntactic translation). In Section 3 we prove the completeness of the translated r system w.r.t. the new semantics directly. This demonstrates the advantages of using this simplified semantics. In Section 4 we generalize the ◊ c i naturally to a binary one and show that the extended language is in fact equally expressive as ELKv r . On the other hand, the extended language facilitates a transparent normal logic proof system. It then helps us in Section 5 to come up with a notion of bisimulation for ELKv r and obtain a proof system for a weaker language proposed earlier. We conclude in the end with future directions.
Negation of Kv i as a diamond
As we mentioned in the introduction, ¬Kv i (φ, c) can be viewed as a diamond formula ◊ 
where p ∈ P, c ∈ C, i ∈ I. We can, without difficulty, inductively define a translation function T from the original ELKv r to this modal language (the other way is also straightforward):
Definition 2.1 A translation function T from ELKv
r to MLKv r formulas is defined as follows:
Now we have the following translated axioms (the names are kept):
We can massage the axioms, 3 and obtain the following equivalent system (modulo translation T) from r (i.e. 
is not, e.g., all the p worlds agree on the value of c and all the q worlds agree on the value of c but they just cannot agree with each other. This demonstrates that ◊ c i is apparently not a normal modality. However, as we will discover later that this apparent non-normality is a bit misleading and we will restore the normality in the next section by considering a natural binary generalization of the ◊ c i operator. Now we are going to give a simplified but equivalent semantics to MLKv r such that the system r is sound and complete. The idea is to abandon the first-order Kripke model and use a rather standard Kripke model for propositional modal logics since much of the information in the FO Kripke model is not relevant for the language MLKv r .
Definition 2.2 A model for MLKv r is a tuple 〈S, {→
• 〈S, {→ i : i ∈ I}, V 〉 is a standard Kripke model with binary relations.
• For each c ∈ C, R c i is a triple relation over S satisfying for any s, t, u, v ∈ S:
The new semantics is defined as follows which reflects the intuition behind R c i : 
Lemma 2.3 For any set of ELKv
Proof It suffices to prove that for any set of ELKv r formula Σ, Σ is -satisfiable iff T (Σ) is -satisfiable. We say that an ELKv r model , s is equivalent to an MLKv r 4 Euclidean property says that ∀x, y, z : xR y ∧ xRz → yRz. Taking R ′ =R we have ∀x, y, z :
Our condition is inspired by this observation. 5 Careful readers may wonder about whether we can break the the ternary relation into two: the i-relation and an anti-equivalence relation. We will come back to this point at the end of the paper. 
It can be verified that ′ has the three properties of MLKv r models, 6 and there is no state v such that uP 
To simplify notation, we shall write (s, 0) as s ′ in the rest of this proof. Now we unravel
there is a path s 6 Take the anti-euclidean property as an example. Suppose (u, 
• 〈s
Intuitively, the new model ′ starts from 〈s ′ 〉, and each state corresponds to a path which is accessible from s ′ in ′ . It is not hard to verify the three properties of MLKv r models. 7 By definition, the → skeleton of ′ is a tree-like structure: acyclic, every state except the root 〈s ′ 〉 can be reached eventually by 〈s ′ 〉 and has one and only one predecessor. It follows that for any u, v in ′ , it is not the case that u → i v and u → j v for any i = j. Now we can prove the following by induction on the structure of φ ∈ MLKv r :
Now the only thing left is to transform the MLKv r model ′ into an equivalent • W and { → i : i ∈ I} are exactly the same as in ′ ;
• U = U ′ ;
is the equivalence class under the equivalence relation ∼ over C × W defined as:
To make sure is well-defined, we need to show that ∼ is an equivalence relation. Reflexivity and symmetry are obvious, and for transitivity: We still need to verify that this assignment is good, in the sense that: for any ELKv r formula φ, ′ , w T (φ) ⇐⇒ , w φ for any w ∈ W . We prove this by induction on φ and only show the non-trivial case: implies ∃u such that uQ c i t t ′ . But we have shown that every state has exactly one predecessor, so u = w, and wQ c i t t ′ . By induction hypothesis, ′ , t T (ψ) and 
With (1), (2) and (3), we can now conclude that for any MLKv r model , t there is always an equivalent ELKv r model , s and this concludes the proof.
Remark 2.4
The above lemma implies that for any ELKv r formula φ:
which asserts the validities are the same modulo the translation. We need the stronger version to handle strong completeness later.
Completeness of r
In this section, we show a direct proof of the strong completeness of r proposed in the previous section. As we will see, this proof is much simpler compared to the original completeness proof of r in [13] due to the fact that we do not need to construct a FO canonical Kripke model with value assignments anymore. • S is the set of all maximal r -consistent sets of MLKv r formulas, (2){ψ :
Note that condition (2) ψ ∈ s} such that ψ 1 ∈ u ∪ t and ψ 2 ∈ v ∪ t. According to the property of maximal consistent sets, this entails ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ∈ u ∪ t and ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ∈ v ∪ t. Now, we distinguish two situations: ◊ i (¬ψ 1 ∧ ¬ψ 2 ) ∈ s and ◊ i (¬ψ 1 ∧ ¬ψ 2 ) ∈ s, and go on to show that in both cases we would arrive at contradiction.
Suppose
According to the definition of R c i , we have ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 ∈ t. By the property of MCS, at least one of ψ 1 and ψ 2 is in t. However, since ψ 1 ∈ u ∪ t and ψ 2 ∈ v ∪ t, we have
Therefore, the canonical model is indeed an MLKv r model.
By a Lindenbaum-like argument, every consistent set of MLKv r formulas can be extended to a maximal consistent set (of MLKv r formulas). In the following we (as routine) prove the existence lemma for both modalities ◊ i and ◊ c i in order to obtain the truth lemma. The proof is the r adaption of the proof of r in [13] . Given a state s ∈ S such that ◊ c i φ ∈ s. We let Z = {ψ | i ψ ∈ s} ∪ {φ} and X = {χ | c i χ ∈ s}. Since X is countable, we list the elements in X as χ i for i ∈ . Note that since ⊢ c i ⊤, ⊤ ∈ X , namely X is non-empty. Fact 3.3 For any χ ∈ X , {χ} ∪ Z is consistent. Therefore Z and every χ are also consistent.
Proof Suppose not, then there exists
This together with the fact that i (φ → ¬χ) ∈ s and ◊ c i φ ∈ s (assumption), we have ◊ c i ¬χ ∈ s, contradiction. Since ⊤ ∈ X , {⊤} ∪ Z is consistent thus Z is consistent.
Let B 0 = Z ∪ {χ 0 }, C 0 = Z. We inductively construct B n and C n as following:
• Else, B n+1 = B n , C n+1 = C n ∪ {χ n+1 }.
• Finally, let B = n<ω B n , C = n<ω C n .
In order to show that B and C are consistent we first show that B n and C n are consistent for each n < ω. Proof Suppose not, i.e., χ k+1 is not consistent with both B k and C k . Let U = B k \Z, V = C k \ Z, U = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ U}, and V = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ V }. Then there exist α 1 , . . . , α l , β 1 , . . . , β m , γ 1 , . . . , γ n ∈ Z such that:
The last one is due to the fact that any formula in C k \ Z is inconsistent with B k by construction. By NECK, DISTK and the definition of Z and X , we have
Then, we claim that
Finally, since Proof Suppose B is not consistent. That is, there exist φ 1 , . . . , φ n ∈ B such that ⊢ φ 1 ∧· · ·∧φ n → ⊥. Therefore, there must be a finite m such that φ 1 , . . . , φ n ∈ B m . But this means that B m is already inconsistent, contradictory to the construction of B k . The case for C is similar.
It is routine to prove the following: Remark 3.10 At this point, it is interesting to compare our canonical model with the canonical model used in [13] . A complication in [13] is that merely maximal consistent sets are not enough to build a FO canonical Kripke model. However, as we have seen, we only use the maximal consistent sets in our canonical MLKv r model: it does not involve value assignments. Thus we have restored the symmetry between the logical language and the model to some extent: there is no longer too much information in the model, which cannot be talked about by the language. Note that we allow sR i t t, which also helps to have compact models.
Extended language with binary modalities
In the previous sections, we treat ◊ c i as a unary modality interpreted by a ternary relation. Essentially, ◊ c i can be viewed as a binary modality where the two arguments are the same. In this section, we restore the symmetry between the semantics and the syntax one step further by having the binary ◊ c i (·, ·) in the language. Surprisingly, this extension does not increase the expressive power of MLKv r . What is more, the new logic is normal. Consequently, the extension will help us to understand MLKv r more deeply from a normal modal logic point of view.
The extended language MLKv b is given by the following BNF ( b for binary):
We define ◊ The above semantics coincides with the standard semantics for binary diamond • S is the set of maximal -consistent sets,
• s → i t ⇐⇒ {φ : i φ ∈ s} ⊆ t, of c. Correspondingly, in the language, besides ◊ i φ we may introduce ◊ c φ formulas saying that there is a different world where φ holds but c has a different value compared to the current world. However, it is not straightforward to express ¬Kv(ψ, c) in this language. The closest counterpart ◊ i (ψ ∧ ◊ c ψ) will not do the job alone. We probably need to add a further condition: ◊ i ◊ c p → ◊ i p which says the ≍ c successors of an i-reachable world are again i-reachable. Actually it means that we should combine → i and ≍ c which is almost our ternary R c i . Moreover, to axiomatize this ≍ c we need the axioms of anti-equivalence (irreflexivity, symmetry, and anti-euclidean property 10 ). However, irreflexivity and anti-euclidean property for the binary ≍ c are not definable in modal logic. We probably need to do the same as in the ◊ c i case: use Kv∨ to capture the i-accessible anti-euclidean property to some extent. Having said the above, it is clear that our approach in this paper is more intuitive and technically natural.
To close, we list a few directions which we leave for future occasions:
• The corresponding results in the setting of epistemic (S5) models.
• Characterization theorem of ELKv r (MLKv r ) within first-order modal logic via C-bisimulation.
• A decision procedure for ELKv r (MLKv r ) based on the simplified models.
• In similar ways, we can try to simplify the semantics for other "knowing-X" logics, such as knowing whether, knowing how, and so on.
